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January, 2004 THE US and Canada are on a massive hunt to pinpoint the real causes of the big power failure that occurred on the evening of August 14, 2003, and threw life completely out of gear in large sections of two countries. For the US, the hi-tech capital of the world, it was an image-tarring incident and now, it fast wants to carry out an image-repairing exercise. The two countries have jointly constituted a "Power System Outrage Task Force" which has been working to single out the exact reason for the Big Blackout. The Task Force has created three working groups to look into different aspects of the blackout. The first is Electric System Working Group. This group is checking out various components of the power grid and its operation systems. It has a massive task at hand as the US electric grid has a very complex and sensitive infrastructure. The second is Nuclear Working Group looking into the effects of the blackout on the working of nuclear power stations situated in the affected areas. The third is Security Working Group investigating the possibility of any sabotage of power grid or any intentional actions behind the blackout. As Herb Dhaliwal, the Canadian Minister of Indian origin, supervises the investigation, the Task Force has prepared its interim report on the blackout and has come out with some definite conclusions. And the major conclusion of the Interim Report is that the blackout was largely preventable! It has been found that the problem began in Ohio. Three high-voltage transmission lines came in contact with some trees very close to them, short-circuited and went out of service. These lines were being operated by a company named First Energy Corporation. As was provided in the system, as soon as the transmission lines short-circuited, an alarm should have been triggered on, alerting the control room operators. But the alarm system was not working properly. It didn't go on. To add to this, the monitoring equipment of First Energy Corporation too was not working well. It also failed to tell about the downed lines. Had the control room operators been alerted, they could have done some loadshedding thus keeping the problem within control. Moreover, they could have informed the neighbouring utilities and reliability coordinators who could have taken action to prevent overloading of other lines under use. So electricity flowed to other lines causing their overloading. While all this was taking shape, another entity, Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), was having problems with its system analysis tools. MISO is mainly a coordinating agency for different operating agencies, including First Energy Corporation. So it didn't come to know about the problems with First Energy Corporation. The working group also found that MISO was using outdated data in its monitoring job which prevented it from detecting problems and taking remedial action. It was also not equipped with effective means to pinpoint the exact location of a fault in the transmission lines. So MISO too could not take action to stop or lessen the problem from aggravating. The result was that the balance between generation and consumption of electricity was disturbed. Large fluctuations in voltage levels destabilised the system. Excessive electricity quickly moved to the other lines which were not prepared to receive it and got shut down. So electricity moved further on to other lines, overloading and shutting off more and more of them. This made the power imbalance grow more and more leading to an uncontrollable situation and resulting into this cascading blackout. The first working group has also related the geography of the area with the massive blackout. The number of power lines in an area, their proximity to major power plants and load centres, the extent of electricity already flowing in the lines that received extra electricity and the nature of protective equipment also played their role in the spread of blackout. The second working group has found no fault with the working of nuclear power stations in the area. All the affected nuclear plants followed the laid procedures and shut down safely during the power failure and were restarted safely when the grid was restored. The third working group, after its detailed investigations, has ruled out any possibility of a terrorist attack, sabotage, deliberate damage or foul play. So the investigation sums up to ineffective operation, control and monitoring of transmission system as the basic reason for blackout. Moving in a systematic manner, the Task Force will now hold a number of public meetings in the affected areas and will invite public opinion on the findings of the working groups. Public shall also be asked to present their ideas for improvement of the system and prevention of such an incident in future. Then under phase III, the Task Force shall issue a final report with its recommendations for improvement of system. Under Phase IV, action on the final report shall begin. In parallel to the above investigation, the US has asked India for guidance in tackling blackouts and managing transmission system. Power Grid Corporation of India (PGCIL) is now planning to set up a $ 250 million pilot transmission project in the US. PGCIL teams have already visited the US, have made presentations to the Federal Electricity Regulatory Committee (FERC) on the transmission system in India. The US Power department is now going to associate with PGCIL to revamp its transmission network system.
While this exercise continues, what emerges clearly is that the complex and sensitive power grids can function properly only if a balance between electric supply and demand is maintained. Problems are to be identified by the engineers and allied staff by remaining ahead of the problems and taking remedial action before they grow beyond a certain magnitude and become uncontrollable. And if the undesirable situation arises, the problem must be located and the balance restored by regulating the power supply from power plants or by adjusting equipment to stabilise the power or by taking the consumers off-line.
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